The first stage of research, twenty years ago, on the subclass of 1-convex TU games dealt with its characterization through some regular core structure. Appealing abstract and practical examples of 1-convex games were missing until now. Both drawbacks are solved. On the one hand, a generating set for the cone of 1-concave cost games is introduced with clear affinities to the unanimity games taking into account the complementary transformation on coalitions. The dividends within this new game representation are used to characterize the 1-concavity constraint as well as to investigate the core property of the Shapley value for cost games. We present a simple formula to compute the nucleolus and the $\tau$-value within the class of 1-convex/1-concave games and show that in a 1-convex/1-concave game there is an explicit relation between the nucleolus and the Shapley value. On the other hand, an appealing practical example of 1-concave cost game has cropped up not long ago in Sales's Ph.D study of Catalan university library consortium for subscription to journals issued by Kluwer publishing house, the so-called library cost game which turn out to be decomposable into the abstract 1-concave cost games of the generating set mentioned above.
|Name||Memorandum Afdeling TW|
|Publisher||University of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics|