Abstract
Bitcoin is still the most widely used cryptocurrency. A big part of Bitcoin’s appeal is that it maintains a distributed ledger for transactions known as the blockchain. Miners receive a fee for every block of transactions that they mine, and should expect a reward proportional to the computational power they provide to the network. Eyal and Sirer introduced seflish mining, a strategy timing the publication of blocks to give them a significant edge in profits. This paper models the behavior of honest and selfish mining pools in Uppaal, and analyses properties of the mining process in the presence of network delay. This shows what effects selfish mining would have on the share of profits, but also on
the number of orphaned blocks in the blockchain. This analysis allows us to compare those results to known results from literature and to real world data. This analysis shows that it is essential to take into account that there does not exist a single view of the blockchain.
the number of orphaned blocks in the blockchain. This analysis allows us to compare those results to known results from literature and to real world data. This analysis shows that it is essential to take into account that there does not exist a single view of the blockchain.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages | 48-59 |
| Publication status | Published - 11 Oct 2019 |
| Event | 3rd World Congress on Formal Methods, FM 2019 - Porto, Portugal Duration: 7 Oct 2019 → 11 Oct 2019 Conference number: 3 https://sites.google.com/view/fmbc/home |
Workshop
| Workshop | 3rd World Congress on Formal Methods, FM 2019 |
|---|---|
| Abbreviated title | FM 2019 |
| Country/Territory | Portugal |
| City | Porto |
| Period | 7/10/19 → 11/10/19 |
| Internet address |