A Distributed Blockchain Model of Selfish Mining

Dennis Eijkel, Ansgar Fehnker*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperAcademicpeer-review

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Abstract

Bitcoin is still the most widely used cryptocurrency. A big part of Bitcoin’s appeal is that it maintains a distributed ledger for transactions known as the blockchain. Miners receive a fee for every block of transactions that they mine, and should expect a reward proportional to the computational power they provide to the network. Eyal and Sirer introduced seflish mining, a strategy timing the publication of blocks to give them a significant edge in profits. This paper models the behavior of honest and selfish mining pools in Uppaal, and analyses properties of the mining process in the presence of network delay. This shows what effects selfish mining would have on the share of profits, but also on
the number of orphaned blocks in the blockchain. This analysis allows us to compare those results to known results from literature and to real world data. This analysis shows that it is essential to take into account that there does not exist a single view of the blockchain.
Original languageEnglish
Pages48-59
Publication statusPublished - 11 Oct 2019
Event3rd World Congress on Formal Methods, FM 2019 - Porto, Portugal
Duration: 7 Oct 201911 Oct 2019
Conference number: 3
https://sites.google.com/view/fmbc/home

Workshop

Workshop3rd World Congress on Formal Methods, FM 2019
Abbreviated titleFM 2019
CountryPortugal
CityPorto
Period7/10/1911/10/19
Internet address

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