Abstract
Besides being the de facto routing protocol of the Internet, the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) has also been used for mitigating Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks for many years. In such situations, victims of DDoS attacks use BGP to redirect attack traffic to a “scrubber” outside their network, which separates clean traffic from DDoS traffic and forwards the former to the victim’s network. While there exist many BGP-based DDoS scrubbing providers, their adoption on the global Internet remains unstudied. This paper aims to fill this gap by identifying and characterizing Autonomous Systems (ASes) and prefixes protected by five of the leading scrubbing providers, using AS path patterns in public BGP routing data. Our study focuses on scrubbers that allow their protected ASes to originate their prefixes themselves. We find that the percentage of ASes using this kind of protection has increased almost three times
(from 0.7% to 2% and from 464 ASes to 1,730 ASes) between 2020 and 2024. Similarly, the percentage of protected prefixes has also increased three times in the same period, from 0.3% to 0.9% and from 3,154 to 12,362 prefixes, across both IPv4 and IPv6. Globally, we observe a higher adoption rate among financial
institutions, while adoption remains low among educational institutions. We believe our insights will be useful for individual AS operators to find the transit providers or peers that are DDoS-protected. It might also be useful for (national) policy-makers to incentivize the adoption of DDoS protection services and for
researchers studying the phenomenon of DDoS scrubbing.
(from 0.7% to 2% and from 464 ASes to 1,730 ASes) between 2020 and 2024. Similarly, the percentage of protected prefixes has also increased three times in the same period, from 0.3% to 0.9% and from 3,154 to 12,362 prefixes, across both IPv4 and IPv6. Globally, we observe a higher adoption rate among financial
institutions, while adoption remains low among educational institutions. We believe our insights will be useful for individual AS operators to find the transit providers or peers that are DDoS-protected. It might also be useful for (national) policy-makers to incentivize the adoption of DDoS protection services and for
researchers studying the phenomenon of DDoS scrubbing.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | 2025 21st International Conference on Network and Service Management (CNSM) |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 978-3-903176-75-1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 22 Dec 2025 |
| Event | 21th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2025 - Bologna, Italy Duration: 27 Oct 2025 → 31 Oct 2025 Conference number: 21 https://www.cnsm-conf.org/2025/ |
Conference
| Conference | 21th International Conference on Network and Service Management, CNSM 2025 |
|---|---|
| Abbreviated title | CNSM 2025 |
| Country/Territory | Italy |
| City | Bologna |
| Period | 27/10/25 → 31/10/25 |
| Internet address |