A Logic for Auditing Accountability in Decentralized Systems

R. Corin, S. Etalle, J. den Hartog, G. Lenzini, I. Staicu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

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Abstract

We propose a language that allows agents to distribute data with usage policies in a decentralized architecture. In our framework, the compliance with usage policies is not enforced. However, agents may be audited by an authority at an arbitrary moment in time. We design a logic that allows audited agents to prove their actions, and to prove their authorization to posses particular data. Accountability is defined in several flavors, including agent accountability and data accountability. Finally, we show the soundness of the logic.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationFormal Aspects in Security and Trust
Subtitle of host publicationIFIP TC1 WG1.7 Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust (FAST), World Computer Congress, August 22–27, 2004, Toulouse, France
EditorsTheo Dimitrakos, Fabio Martinelli
Place of PublicationBoston, MA
PublisherSpringer
Pages187-201
Number of pages15
ISBN (Electronic)978-0-387-24098-5
ISBN (Print)978-0-387-24050-3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2004
EventIFIP TC1 WG1.7 Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust, FAST 2004 - Toulouse, France
Duration: 22 Aug 200427 Aug 2004

Publication series

NameIFIP International Federation for Information Processing
PublisherKluwer Academic Publishers
Volume173
ISSN (Print)1571-5736

Workshop

WorkshopIFIP TC1 WG1.7 Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust, FAST 2004
Abbreviated titleFAST
CountryFrance
CityToulouse
Period22/08/0427/08/04

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Keywords

  • SCS-Cybersecurity
  • EC Grant Agreement nr.: FP6/507894
  • Proof system
  • Observable action
  • Decentralize system
  • Usage policy
  • Agent accountability

Cite this

Corin, R., Etalle, S., den Hartog, J., Lenzini, G., & Staicu, I. (2004). A Logic for Auditing Accountability in Decentralized Systems. In T. Dimitrakos, & F. Martinelli (Eds.), Formal Aspects in Security and Trust: IFIP TC1 WG1.7 Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust (FAST), World Computer Congress, August 22–27, 2004, Toulouse, France (pp. 187-201). (IFIP International Federation for Information Processing; Vol. 173). Boston, MA: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-24098-5_14
Corin, R. ; Etalle, S. ; den Hartog, J. ; Lenzini, G. ; Staicu, I. / A Logic for Auditing Accountability in Decentralized Systems. Formal Aspects in Security and Trust: IFIP TC1 WG1.7 Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust (FAST), World Computer Congress, August 22–27, 2004, Toulouse, France. editor / Theo Dimitrakos ; Fabio Martinelli. Boston, MA : Springer, 2004. pp. 187-201 (IFIP International Federation for Information Processing).
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title = "A Logic for Auditing Accountability in Decentralized Systems",
abstract = "We propose a language that allows agents to distribute data with usage policies in a decentralized architecture. In our framework, the compliance with usage policies is not enforced. However, agents may be audited by an authority at an arbitrary moment in time. We design a logic that allows audited agents to prove their actions, and to prove their authorization to posses particular data. Accountability is defined in several flavors, including agent accountability and data accountability. Finally, we show the soundness of the logic.",
keywords = "SCS-Cybersecurity, EC Grant Agreement nr.: FP6/507894, Proof system, Observable action, Decentralize system, Usage policy, Agent accountability",
author = "R. Corin and S. Etalle and {den Hartog}, J. and G. Lenzini and I. Staicu",
year = "2004",
month = "8",
doi = "10.1007/0-387-24098-5_14",
language = "English",
isbn = "978-0-387-24050-3",
series = "IFIP International Federation for Information Processing",
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editor = "Theo Dimitrakos and Fabio Martinelli",
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Corin, R, Etalle, S, den Hartog, J, Lenzini, G & Staicu, I 2004, A Logic for Auditing Accountability in Decentralized Systems. in T Dimitrakos & F Martinelli (eds), Formal Aspects in Security and Trust: IFIP TC1 WG1.7 Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust (FAST), World Computer Congress, August 22–27, 2004, Toulouse, France. IFIP International Federation for Information Processing, vol. 173, Springer, Boston, MA, pp. 187-201, IFIP TC1 WG1.7 Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust, FAST 2004, Toulouse, France, 22/08/04. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-24098-5_14

A Logic for Auditing Accountability in Decentralized Systems. / Corin, R.; Etalle, S.; den Hartog, J.; Lenzini, G.; Staicu, I.

Formal Aspects in Security and Trust: IFIP TC1 WG1.7 Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust (FAST), World Computer Congress, August 22–27, 2004, Toulouse, France. ed. / Theo Dimitrakos; Fabio Martinelli. Boston, MA : Springer, 2004. p. 187-201 (IFIP International Federation for Information Processing; Vol. 173).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

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AB - We propose a language that allows agents to distribute data with usage policies in a decentralized architecture. In our framework, the compliance with usage policies is not enforced. However, agents may be audited by an authority at an arbitrary moment in time. We design a logic that allows audited agents to prove their actions, and to prove their authorization to posses particular data. Accountability is defined in several flavors, including agent accountability and data accountability. Finally, we show the soundness of the logic.

KW - SCS-Cybersecurity

KW - EC Grant Agreement nr.: FP6/507894

KW - Proof system

KW - Observable action

KW - Decentralize system

KW - Usage policy

KW - Agent accountability

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Corin R, Etalle S, den Hartog J, Lenzini G, Staicu I. A Logic for Auditing Accountability in Decentralized Systems. In Dimitrakos T, Martinelli F, editors, Formal Aspects in Security and Trust: IFIP TC1 WG1.7 Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust (FAST), World Computer Congress, August 22–27, 2004, Toulouse, France. Boston, MA: Springer. 2004. p. 187-201. (IFIP International Federation for Information Processing). https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-24098-5_14