Abstract
In a recent paper [Mathematical Social Sciences 43 (2002) 151], M.R. Sanver investigates scoring rules for social choice problems with n voters and m alternatives. He proves that unless n{2, 3, 4, 6, 8} a scoring rule cannot simultaneously respect majority in choice and majority in elimination. In this short technical note, we first point out a serious flaw in Sanver’s proof. Then we provide a complete proof for a corrected version of Sanver’s statement: Unless n{2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12} a scoring rule cannot simultaneously respect majority in choice and majority in elimination
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 347-354 |
Number of pages | 8 |
Journal | Mathematical social sciences |
Volume | 46 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2003 |
Keywords
- Scoring rules
- IR-58664
- METIS-213315
- Respecting majority