A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination

Gerhard Woeginger

doi:10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00050-7

A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination

Gerhard Woeginger

Discrete Mathematics and Mathematical Programming

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In a recent paper [Mathematical Social Sciences 43 (2002) 151], M.R. Sanver investigates scoring rules for social choice problems with n voters and m alternatives. He proves that unless n{2, 3, 4, 6, 8} a scoring rule cannot simultaneously respect majority in choice and majority in elimination. In this short technical note, we first point out a serious flaw in Sanver’s proof. Then we provide a complete proof for a corrected version of Sanver’s statement: Unless n{2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12} a scoring rule cannot simultaneously respect majority in choice and majority in elimination

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	347-354
Number of pages	8
Journal	Mathematical social sciences
Volume	46
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00050-7
Publication status	Published - 2003

Keywords

Scoring rules
IR-58664
METIS-213315
Respecting majority

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