A note on the nucleolus for 2-convex TU games

Theo Driessen; Dongshuang Hou

doi:10.1007/s00182-009-0216-z

A note on the nucleolus for 2-convex TU games

Theo Driessen, Dongshuang Hou

Discrete Mathematics and Mathematical Programming

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

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Abstract

For 2-convex n-person cooperative TU games, the nucleolus is determined as some type of constrained equal award rule. Its proof is based on Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley’s geometrical characterization for the intersection of the prekernel with the core. Pairwise bargaining ranges within the core are required to be in equilibrium. This system of non-linear equations is solved and its unique solution agrees with the nucleolus.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	185-189
Number of pages	5
Journal	International journal of game theory
Volume	39
Issue number	1-2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0216-z
Publication status	Published - Mar 2010

Keywords

Cooperative game
2-convex n-person game
Core
Nucleolus

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A note on the nucleolus for 2-convex TU games

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Keywords

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