A note on the nucleolus for 2-convex TU games

Theo Driessen, Dongshuang Hou

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)
56 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

For 2-convex n-person cooperative TU games, the nucleolus is determined as some type of constrained equal award rule. Its proof is based on Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley’s geometrical characterization for the intersection of the prekernel with the core. Pairwise bargaining ranges within the core are required to be in equilibrium. This system of non-linear equations is solved and its unique solution agrees with the nucleolus.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)185-189
Number of pages5
JournalInternational journal of game theory
Volume39
Issue number1-2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2010

Keywords

  • Cooperative game
  • 2-convex n-person game
  • Core
  • Nucleolus

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