A note on the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game

Dongshuang Hou*, Hao Sun, Panfei Sun, Theo Driessen

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The main goal of this paper is two-fold. First, we introduce the so-called airport cost pooling game, which is a generalization of the well-known class of airport game (Littlechild and Thompson, 1977). We determine the Shapley value of this class of game through a decomposition method for this game into unanimity cost games, exploiting the linearity of the Shapley value. Second, we characterize the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game by applying the so-called collective balanced contributions property, meaning that for any two airplanes from two different airlines, the withdrawal of one airline leads to the same loss to the airplane in the other.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)162-169
Number of pages8
JournalGames and economic behavior
Volume108
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2018

Keywords

  • Airport cost pooling game
  • Characterization
  • Collective balanced contributions property
  • Shapley value

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