TY - JOUR
T1 - A note on the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game
AU - Hou, Dongshuang
AU - Sun, Hao
AU - Sun, Panfei
AU - Driessen, Theo
PY - 2018/3
Y1 - 2018/3
N2 - The main goal of this paper is two-fold. First, we introduce the so-called airport cost pooling game, which is a generalization of the well-known class of airport game (Littlechild and Thompson, 1977). We determine the Shapley value of this class of game through a decomposition method for this game into unanimity cost games, exploiting the linearity of the Shapley value. Second, we characterize the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game by applying the so-called collective balanced contributions property, meaning that for any two airplanes from two different airlines, the withdrawal of one airline leads to the same loss to the airplane in the other.
AB - The main goal of this paper is two-fold. First, we introduce the so-called airport cost pooling game, which is a generalization of the well-known class of airport game (Littlechild and Thompson, 1977). We determine the Shapley value of this class of game through a decomposition method for this game into unanimity cost games, exploiting the linearity of the Shapley value. Second, we characterize the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game by applying the so-called collective balanced contributions property, meaning that for any two airplanes from two different airlines, the withdrawal of one airline leads to the same loss to the airplane in the other.
KW - Airport cost pooling game
KW - Characterization
KW - Collective balanced contributions property
KW - Shapley value
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85018925099&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.007
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.007
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85018925099
VL - 108
SP - 162
EP - 169
JO - Games and economic behavior
JF - Games and economic behavior
SN - 0899-8256
ER -