An intruder model for verifying liveness in security protocols

J.G. Cederquist, Muhammad Torabi Dashti

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

    10 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We present a process algebraic intruder model for verifying a class of liveness properties of security protocols. For this class, the proposed intruder model is proved to be equivalent to a Dolev-Yao intruder that does not delay indefinitely the delivery of messages. In order to prove the equivalence, we formalize the resilient communication channels assumption. As an application of the proposed intruder model, formal verification of fair exchange protocols is discussed.
    Original languageUndefined
    Title of host publicationFMSE '06: Proceedings of the fourth ACM workshop on Formal methods in security
    Place of PublicationNew York
    PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery (ACM)
    Pages23-32
    Number of pages10
    ISBN (Print)1-59593-550-9
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2006

    Publication series

    Name
    PublisherACM

    Keywords

    • SCS-Cybersecurity
    • EWI-9140
    • METIS-237420
    • IR-63933

    Cite this

    Cederquist, J. G., & Dashti, M. T. (2006). An intruder model for verifying liveness in security protocols. In FMSE '06: Proceedings of the fourth ACM workshop on Formal methods in security (pp. 23-32). [10.1145/1180337.1180340] New York: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). https://doi.org/10.1145/1180337.1180340