Anonymity for key-trees with adaptive adversaries

Michael Beye; Thijs Veugen

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-31909-9_23

Anonymity for key-trees with adaptive adversaries

Michael Beye^*, Thijs Veugen

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Hash-lock authentication protocols for Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) tags incur heavy search on the server. Key-trees have been proposed as a way to reduce search times, but because partial keys in such trees are shared, key compromise affects several tags. Buttyán [4] and Beye and Veugen [3] devised trees to withstand such attacks, but assumed adversaries to be non-adaptive, without access to side-channel information. We illustrate how in practice, side-channel information can be used to attack the system. We also describe adaptive attacks that are easy to mount and will significantly reduce tag anonymity. Theoretical analysis of the implications on anonymity in key-trees leads to new requirements and a new tree construction. Simulation is used to test its performance, the results showing an improved resistance to adaptive attacks.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Security and Privacy in Communication Networks
Subtitle of host publication	7th International ICST Conference, SecureComm 2011, London, September 7-9, 2011, Revised Selected Papers
Editors	Muttukrishnan Rajarajan, Fred Piper, Haining Wang, George Kesidis
Place of Publication	Berlin, Heidelberg
Publisher	Springer
Pages	409-425
Number of pages	17
ISBN (Electronic)	978-3-642-31909-9
ISBN (Print)	978-3-642-31908-2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31909-9_23
Publication status	Published - 2012
Externally published	Yes
Event	7th International ICST Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks, SecureComm 2011 - London, United Kingdom Duration: 7 Sept 2011 → 9 Sept 2011 Conference number: 7

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
Publisher	Springer
Volume	96
ISSN (Print)	1867-8211
ISSN (Electronic)	1867-822X

Conference

Conference	7th International ICST Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks, SecureComm 2011
Abbreviated title	SecureComm 2011
Country/Territory	United Kingdom
City	London
Period	7/09/11 → 9/09/11

Keywords

Adaptive adversaries
Anonymity
Anonymity set
Hash-lock protocol
Key-tree
RFID
n/a OA procedure

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-642-31909-9_23

Cite this

Beye, M., & Veugen, T. (2012). Anonymity for key-trees with adaptive adversaries. In M. Rajarajan, F. Piper, H. Wang, & G. Kesidis (Eds.), Security and Privacy in Communication Networks: 7th International ICST Conference, SecureComm 2011, London, September 7-9, 2011, Revised Selected Papers (pp. 409-425). (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering; Vol. 96). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31909-9_23

Beye, Michael ; Veugen, Thijs. / Anonymity for key-trees with adaptive adversaries. Security and Privacy in Communication Networks: 7th International ICST Conference, SecureComm 2011, London, September 7-9, 2011, Revised Selected Papers. editor / Muttukrishnan Rajarajan ; Fred Piper ; Haining Wang ; George Kesidis. Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer, 2012. pp. 409-425 (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering).

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abstract = "Hash-lock authentication protocols for Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) tags incur heavy search on the server. Key-trees have been proposed as a way to reduce search times, but because partial keys in such trees are shared, key compromise affects several tags. Butty{\'a}n [4] and Beye and Veugen [3] devised trees to withstand such attacks, but assumed adversaries to be non-adaptive, without access to side-channel information. We illustrate how in practice, side-channel information can be used to attack the system. We also describe adaptive attacks that are easy to mount and will significantly reduce tag anonymity. Theoretical analysis of the implications on anonymity in key-trees leads to new requirements and a new tree construction. Simulation is used to test its performance, the results showing an improved resistance to adaptive attacks.",

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Beye, M & Veugen, T 2012, Anonymity for key-trees with adaptive adversaries. in M Rajarajan, F Piper, H Wang & G Kesidis (eds), Security and Privacy in Communication Networks: 7th International ICST Conference, SecureComm 2011, London, September 7-9, 2011, Revised Selected Papers. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol. 96, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp. 409-425, 7th International ICST Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks, SecureComm 2011, London, United Kingdom, 7/09/11. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31909-9_23

Anonymity for key-trees with adaptive adversaries. / Beye, Michael; Veugen, Thijs.
Security and Privacy in Communication Networks: 7th International ICST Conference, SecureComm 2011, London, September 7-9, 2011, Revised Selected Papers. ed. / Muttukrishnan Rajarajan; Fred Piper; Haining Wang; George Kesidis. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2012. p. 409-425 (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering; Vol. 96).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

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T1 - Anonymity for key-trees with adaptive adversaries

AU - Beye, Michael

AU - Veugen, Thijs

N1 - Conference code: 7

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - Hash-lock authentication protocols for Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) tags incur heavy search on the server. Key-trees have been proposed as a way to reduce search times, but because partial keys in such trees are shared, key compromise affects several tags. Buttyán [4] and Beye and Veugen [3] devised trees to withstand such attacks, but assumed adversaries to be non-adaptive, without access to side-channel information. We illustrate how in practice, side-channel information can be used to attack the system. We also describe adaptive attacks that are easy to mount and will significantly reduce tag anonymity. Theoretical analysis of the implications on anonymity in key-trees leads to new requirements and a new tree construction. Simulation is used to test its performance, the results showing an improved resistance to adaptive attacks.

AB - Hash-lock authentication protocols for Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) tags incur heavy search on the server. Key-trees have been proposed as a way to reduce search times, but because partial keys in such trees are shared, key compromise affects several tags. Buttyán [4] and Beye and Veugen [3] devised trees to withstand such attacks, but assumed adversaries to be non-adaptive, without access to side-channel information. We illustrate how in practice, side-channel information can be used to attack the system. We also describe adaptive attacks that are easy to mount and will significantly reduce tag anonymity. Theoretical analysis of the implications on anonymity in key-trees leads to new requirements and a new tree construction. Simulation is used to test its performance, the results showing an improved resistance to adaptive attacks.

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KW - n/a OA procedure

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ER -

Beye M, Veugen T. Anonymity for key-trees with adaptive adversaries. In Rajarajan M, Piper F, Wang H, Kesidis G, editors, Security and Privacy in Communication Networks: 7th International ICST Conference, SecureComm 2011, London, September 7-9, 2011, Revised Selected Papers. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. 2012. p. 409-425. (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering). doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-31909-9_23

Anonymity for key-trees with adaptive adversaries

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