Asset management perspective on the duration of public-private partnership contracts: cost-control trade-off?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The risk-incentive model of principal-agent relations and its extensions to infrastructural public-private partnerships outline the efficiency implications of parameters such as contract duration. The predominant focus on individual contracts is of limited use for public agencies that need to allocate their resources efficiently at the level of the entire asset network. This study therefore adopts an asset management perspective on the issue of contract duration in public-private partnership (PPP) contracts. In so doing, this research aims to add to the understanding of asset network level effects of important contractual parameters such as contract duration. Empirical material from the Netherlands illustrates that public professionals tend to think about contract duration in terms of a network cost–network control trade-off. From the data, a hierarchical set of criteria deemed relevant for determination of contract duration is elaborated that ultimately supports network accessibility. Limitations, managerial implications, and suggestions for future research are discussed
Original languageEnglish
Article number04014080
Pages (from-to)-
Number of pages9
JournalJournal of construction engineering and management
Volume141
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 30 Oct 2015

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Asset management
Costs
Trade-offs
Contract duration
Cost control
Public-private partnerships

Keywords

  • IR-95581
  • METIS-307514

Cite this

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title = "Asset management perspective on the duration of public-private partnership contracts: cost-control trade-off?",
abstract = "The risk-incentive model of principal-agent relations and its extensions to infrastructural public-private partnerships outline the efficiency implications of parameters such as contract duration. The predominant focus on individual contracts is of limited use for public agencies that need to allocate their resources efficiently at the level of the entire asset network. This study therefore adopts an asset management perspective on the issue of contract duration in public-private partnership (PPP) contracts. In so doing, this research aims to add to the understanding of asset network level effects of important contractual parameters such as contract duration. Empirical material from the Netherlands illustrates that public professionals tend to think about contract duration in terms of a network cost–network control trade-off. From the data, a hierarchical set of criteria deemed relevant for determination of contract duration is elaborated that ultimately supports network accessibility. Limitations, managerial implications, and suggestions for future research are discussed",
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Asset management perspective on the duration of public-private partnership contracts: cost-control trade-off? / van Buiten, Marinus; Hartmann, Andreas.

In: Journal of construction engineering and management, Vol. 141, No. 3, 04014080, 30.10.2015, p. -.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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AU - van Buiten, Marinus

AU - Hartmann, Andreas

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AB - The risk-incentive model of principal-agent relations and its extensions to infrastructural public-private partnerships outline the efficiency implications of parameters such as contract duration. The predominant focus on individual contracts is of limited use for public agencies that need to allocate their resources efficiently at the level of the entire asset network. This study therefore adopts an asset management perspective on the issue of contract duration in public-private partnership (PPP) contracts. In so doing, this research aims to add to the understanding of asset network level effects of important contractual parameters such as contract duration. Empirical material from the Netherlands illustrates that public professionals tend to think about contract duration in terms of a network cost–network control trade-off. From the data, a hierarchical set of criteria deemed relevant for determination of contract duration is elaborated that ultimately supports network accessibility. Limitations, managerial implications, and suggestions for future research are discussed

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KW - METIS-307514

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DO - 10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0000937

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JO - Journal of construction engineering and management

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