Attacker profiling in quantitative security assessment based on attack trees

Aleksandr Lenin, Jan Willemson, Dyan Permata Sari

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)
81 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We present the results of research of limiting adversarial budget in attack games, and, in particular, in the failure-free attack tree models presented by Buldas-Stepanenko in 2012 and improved in 2013 by Buldas and Lenin. In the previously presented models attacker’s budget was assumed to be unlimited. It is natural to assume that the adversarial budget is limited and such an assumption would allow us to model the adversarial decision making more close to the one that might happen in real life. We analyze three atomic cases – the single atomic case, the atomic AND, and the atomic OR. Even these elementary cases become quite complex, at the same time, limiting adversarial budget does not seem to provide any better or more precise results compared to the failure-free models. For the limited model analysis results to be reliable, it is required that the adversarial reward is estimated with high precision, probably not achievable by providing expert estimations for the quantitative annotations on the attack steps, such as the cost or the success probability. It is doubtful that it is reasonable to face this com- plexity, as the failure-free model provides reliable upper bounds, being at the same time computationally less complex.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSecure IT Systems
Subtitle of host publication19th Nordic Conference, NordSec 2014, Tromsø, Norway, October 15-17, 2014, Proceedings
EditorsKarin Bernsmed, Simone Fischer-Hübner
Place of PublicationBerlin
PublisherSpringer
Pages199-212
Number of pages14
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-319-11599-3
ISBN (Print)978-3-319-11598-6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2014
Event19th Nordic Conference on Secure IT, NordSec 2014 - Tromsø, Norway
Duration: 15 Oct 201417 Oct 2014
Conference number: 19
http://site.uit.no/nordsec2014/

Publication series

NameLecture notes in computer science
PublisherSpringer
Volume8788
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference19th Nordic Conference on Secure IT, NordSec 2014
Abbreviated titleNordSec
CountryNorway
CityTromsø
Period15/10/1417/10/14
Internet address

Fingerprint

decision making
budget
cost
analysis

Keywords

  • EC Grant Agreement nr.: FP7/2007-2013
  • EC Grant Agreement nr.: FP7/318003
  • Boolean function
  • Attack scenario
  • Attack trees
  • Initial population size
  • Attack step

Cite this

Lenin, A., Willemson, J., & Sari, D. P. (2014). Attacker profiling in quantitative security assessment based on attack trees. In K. Bernsmed, & S. Fischer-Hübner (Eds.), Secure IT Systems: 19th Nordic Conference, NordSec 2014, Tromsø, Norway, October 15-17, 2014, Proceedings (pp. 199-212). (Lecture notes in computer science; Vol. 8788). Berlin: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11599-3_12
Lenin, Aleksandr ; Willemson, Jan ; Sari, Dyan Permata. / Attacker profiling in quantitative security assessment based on attack trees. Secure IT Systems: 19th Nordic Conference, NordSec 2014, Tromsø, Norway, October 15-17, 2014, Proceedings. editor / Karin Bernsmed ; Simone Fischer-Hübner. Berlin : Springer, 2014. pp. 199-212 (Lecture notes in computer science).
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Lenin, A, Willemson, J & Sari, DP 2014, Attacker profiling in quantitative security assessment based on attack trees. in K Bernsmed & S Fischer-Hübner (eds), Secure IT Systems: 19th Nordic Conference, NordSec 2014, Tromsø, Norway, October 15-17, 2014, Proceedings. Lecture notes in computer science, vol. 8788, Springer, Berlin, pp. 199-212, 19th Nordic Conference on Secure IT, NordSec 2014, Tromsø, Norway, 15/10/14. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11599-3_12

Attacker profiling in quantitative security assessment based on attack trees. / Lenin, Aleksandr; Willemson, Jan; Sari, Dyan Permata.

Secure IT Systems: 19th Nordic Conference, NordSec 2014, Tromsø, Norway, October 15-17, 2014, Proceedings. ed. / Karin Bernsmed; Simone Fischer-Hübner. Berlin : Springer, 2014. p. 199-212 (Lecture notes in computer science; Vol. 8788).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

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AB - We present the results of research of limiting adversarial budget in attack games, and, in particular, in the failure-free attack tree models presented by Buldas-Stepanenko in 2012 and improved in 2013 by Buldas and Lenin. In the previously presented models attacker’s budget was assumed to be unlimited. It is natural to assume that the adversarial budget is limited and such an assumption would allow us to model the adversarial decision making more close to the one that might happen in real life. We analyze three atomic cases – the single atomic case, the atomic AND, and the atomic OR. Even these elementary cases become quite complex, at the same time, limiting adversarial budget does not seem to provide any better or more precise results compared to the failure-free models. For the limited model analysis results to be reliable, it is required that the adversarial reward is estimated with high precision, probably not achievable by providing expert estimations for the quantitative annotations on the attack steps, such as the cost or the success probability. It is doubtful that it is reasonable to face this com- plexity, as the failure-free model provides reliable upper bounds, being at the same time computationally less complex.

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PB - Springer

CY - Berlin

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Lenin A, Willemson J, Sari DP. Attacker profiling in quantitative security assessment based on attack trees. In Bernsmed K, Fischer-Hübner S, editors, Secure IT Systems: 19th Nordic Conference, NordSec 2014, Tromsø, Norway, October 15-17, 2014, Proceedings. Berlin: Springer. 2014. p. 199-212. (Lecture notes in computer science). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11599-3_12