Attractive evolutionary equilibria

Research output: Other contributionOther research output

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Abstract

We present attractiveness, a refinement criterion for evolutionary equilibria. Equilibria surviving this criterion are robust to small perturbations of the underlying payoff system or the dynamics at hand. Furthermore, certain attractive equilibria are equivalent to others for certain evolutionary dynamics. For instance, each attractive evolutionarily stable strategy is an attractive evolutionarily stable equilibrium for certain barycentric ray-projection dynamics, and vice versa.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherMax Planck Gesellschaft
Number of pages26
Place of PublicationJena, Germany
Publication statusPublished - 14 Apr 2011

Publication series

NamePapers on economics & evolution
PublisherMax Planck Gesellschaft
No.2011-17

Fingerprint

Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
Centrobaric
Evolutionary Dynamics
Small Perturbations
Half line
Refinement
Projection

Keywords

  • METIS-283536
  • IR-76746
  • evolutionary dynamics
  • dynamic & structural stability
  • evolutionary
  • Attractive evolutionary equilibria

Cite this

Joosten, R. A. M. G., & Roorda, B. (2011, Apr 14). Attractive evolutionary equilibria. Jena, Germany: Max Planck Gesellschaft.
Joosten, Reinoud A.M.G. ; Roorda, Berend. / Attractive evolutionary equilibria. 2011. Jena, Germany : Max Planck Gesellschaft. 26 p. (Papers on economics & evolution; 2011-17).
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Joosten, RAMG & Roorda, B 2011, Attractive evolutionary equilibria. Max Planck Gesellschaft, Jena, Germany.

Attractive evolutionary equilibria. / Joosten, Reinoud A.M.G.; Roorda, Berend.

26 p. Jena, Germany : Max Planck Gesellschaft. 2011, . (Papers on economics & evolution; No. 2011-17).

Research output: Other contributionOther research output

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T1 - Attractive evolutionary equilibria

AU - Joosten, Reinoud A.M.G.

AU - Roorda, Berend

PY - 2011/4/14

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N2 - We present attractiveness, a refinement criterion for evolutionary equilibria. Equilibria surviving this criterion are robust to small perturbations of the underlying payoff system or the dynamics at hand. Furthermore, certain attractive equilibria are equivalent to others for certain evolutionary dynamics. For instance, each attractive evolutionarily stable strategy is an attractive evolutionarily stable equilibrium for certain barycentric ray-projection dynamics, and vice versa.

AB - We present attractiveness, a refinement criterion for evolutionary equilibria. Equilibria surviving this criterion are robust to small perturbations of the underlying payoff system or the dynamics at hand. Furthermore, certain attractive equilibria are equivalent to others for certain evolutionary dynamics. For instance, each attractive evolutionarily stable strategy is an attractive evolutionarily stable equilibrium for certain barycentric ray-projection dynamics, and vice versa.

KW - METIS-283536

KW - IR-76746

KW - evolutionary dynamics

KW - dynamic & structural stability

KW - evolutionary

KW - Attractive evolutionary equilibria

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T3 - Papers on economics & evolution

PB - Max Planck Gesellschaft

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