Attractive evolutionary equilibria

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We present attractiveness, a refinement criterion for evolutionary equilibria. Equilibria surviving this criterion are robust to small perturbations of the underlying payoff system or the dynamics at hand. Furthermore, certain attractive equilibria are equivalent to others for certain evolutionary dynamics. For instance, each attractive evolutionarily stable strategy is an attractive evolutionarily stable equilibrium for certain barycentric ray-projection dynamics, and vice versa.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationJena, Germany
PublisherMax Planck Institute of Economics
Number of pages26
Publication statusPublished - 14 Apr 2011

Publication series

NamePapers on economics & evolution
PublisherMax Planck Gesellschaft


  • Evolutionary dynamics
  • Dynamic & structural stability
  • Evolutionary
  • Attractive evolutionary equilibria

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