Budget-restricted utility games with ordered strategic decisions

Maximilian Drees*, Sören Riechers, Alexander Skopalik

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)
4 Downloads (Pure)


We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has to be shared between the tasks. We study strategic budget games, where the budget is shared proportionally. We also consider a variant in which the order of the strategic decisions influences the distribution of the budgets. The complexity of the optimal solution as well as existence, complexity and quality of equilibria are analyzed. Finally, we show that the time an ordered budget game needs to convergence towards an equilibrium may be exponential.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAlgorithmic Game Theory
Subtitle of host publication7th International Symposium, SAGT 2014, Haifa, Israel, September 30 – October 2, 2014. Proceedings
EditorsRon Lavi
Number of pages12
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-662-44803-8
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2014
Externally publishedYes
Event7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2014 - Haifa, Israel
Duration: 30 Sep 20142 Oct 2014
Conference number: 7

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
ISSN (Print)0302-9743


Conference7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2014
Abbreviated titleSAGT 2014
Internet address

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