Characterization of Revenue Equivalence

Birgit Heydenreich, Rudolf Müller, Marc Jochen Uetz, Rakesh Vohra

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The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called \emph{revenue equivalence}. In this paper we give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results are immediate consequences. Moreover, revenue equivalence can be identified in cases where existing theorems are silent.
Original languageUndefined
Place of PublicationEnschede
PublisherUniversity of Twente
Number of pages24
Publication statusPublished - 9 Jan 2008

Publication series

NameCTIT Technical Report Series
PublisherUniversity of Twente, Center for Telematics and Information Technology (CTIT)
ISSN (Print)1381-3625


  • METIS-250857
  • IR-64557
  • EWI-11647

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