Characterization of revenue equivalence

B. Heydenreich, R. Müller, Marc Jochen Uetz, R. Vohra

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38 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. We give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results are immediate consequences. Moreover, revenue equivalence can be identified in cases where existing theorems are silent.
Original languageUndefined
Article number10.3982/ECTA7168
Pages (from-to)307-316
Number of pages10
JournalEconometrica
Volume77
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 9 Jan 2009

Keywords

  • EWI-14695
  • IR-62638
  • METIS-264389

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