Clocks, Caps, Compartments, and Carve‐Outs: Creating Federal Fiscal Capacity Despite Strong Veto Powers

This article examines four mechanisms for establishing federal spending programmes despite tough opposition based on
identity or ideological politics, as well as disputes between haves and have‐nots. It contrasts the use of clocks (time limits),
caps, compartments (special justification for spending that would otherwise have been rejected), and carve‐outs (exemp‐
tions to federal spending programmes to buy off objecting veto players) to secure political support for national‐level pro‐
grammes, and asks under what conditions those limits might be breached. We look at the EU, Canada, and the US. These
tactics are most successful at “getting to yes” for federal authorities when they can isolate individual objections. As long
as those objections persist, the limits will persist as well.