Codecision and its Reform: A comparative Analysis of Decision Making Rules in the European Union

Bernard Steunenberg

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterAcademic


The decision making rules in the European Union have undergone a remarkable change in the last decade. In the Single European Act, which was ratified in 1987, the member countries introduced the so-called cooperation procedure, in which the European Parliament was provided with a suspensive veto on Council decisions. The Treaty on European Union, which came into effect in 1993, changed the suspensive veto of Parliament into an absolute veto, and it introduced a conciliation effort when Parliament disagrees on the Council’s common position. This procedure, which is called the codecision procedure, concerns decision making on the internal market, and it replaces the cooperation procedure, which will apply to other policy fields for which, until recently, the European Parliament only had to be consulted. Most observers indicate that the codecision procedure has ‘strengthened the position of the Parliament’ (Bright, 1995: 34). Moreover, it is regarded as a remarkable step forward’ for Parliament (Westlake, 1994b: 146). Under codecision both Parliament and Council have to agree on a proposal before it can be enacted.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIn: B. Steunenberg and F.A. van Vught (eds). Political Institutions and Public Policy. Perspectives on European Decision Making
EditorsBernard Steunenberg, Frans van Vught
Place of PublicationDordrecht
PublisherKluwer Academic Publishers
Number of pages25
ISBN (Electronic)978-94-015-8603-0
ISBN (Print)978-90-481-4818-9
Publication statusPublished - 1997


  • Ideal point
  • Agenda setter
  • Game tree
  • Council member
  • Qualified majority


Dive into the research topics of 'Codecision and its Reform: A comparative Analysis of Decision Making Rules in the European Union'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this