Combatting electoral traces: the Dutch tempest discussion and beyond

Wolter Pieters

Combatting electoral traces: the Dutch tempest discussion and beyond

Wolter Pieters

Research output: Book/Report › Report › Professional

5 Citations (Scopus)

572 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

In the Dutch e-voting debate, the crucial issue leading to the abandonment of all electronic voting machines was compromising radiation, or tempest. Other countries, however, do not seem to be bothered by this risk. In this paper, we use actor-network theory to analyse the socio-technical origins of the Dutch tempest issue in e-voting, and its consequences for e-voting beyond the Netherlands. We introduce the term electoral traces to denote any physical, digital or social evidence of a voter's choices in an election. From this perspective, we provide guidelines for risk analysis as well as an overview of countermeasures.

Original language	English
Place of Publication	Enschede
Publisher	Centre for Telematics and Information Technology (CTIT)
Number of pages	17
Publication status	Published - Jun 2009

Publication series

Name	CTIT Technical Report Series
Publisher	Centre for Telematics and Information Technology, University of Twente
No.	TR-CTIT-09-21
ISSN (Print)	1381-3625

Keywords

SCS-Cybersecurity

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Combatting electoral traces: the Dutch tempest discussion and beyond
Pieters, W., 2009, E-Voting and Identity: Second International Conference, VOTE-ID 2009. Ryan, P. Y. A. & Schoenmakers, B. (eds.). Berlin: Springer, p. 172-190 17 p. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; vol. 5767).
Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review
6 Downloads (Pure)

Cite this

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Combatting electoral traces: the Dutch tempest discussion and beyond

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Combatting electoral traces: the Dutch tempest discussion and beyond

Cite this