Congestion games with mixed objectives

Matthias Feldotto, Lennart Leder, Alexander Skopalik

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterAcademicpeer-review

    Abstract

    We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games and its bottleneck variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to model network scenarios in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike. We characterize the existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE) and the convergence of improvement dynamics. For games that do not possess PNE we give bounds on the approximation ratio of approximate pure Nash equilibria.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationCombinatorial optimization and applications
    Subtitle of host publication10th International Conference, COCOA 2016, Hong Kong, China, December 16-18, 2016. Proceedings
    EditorsT-H. Hubert Chan, Minming Li, Lusheng Wang
    Place of PublicationCham
    PublisherSpringer
    Pages655-670
    Number of pages16
    ISBN (Electronic)978-3-319-48749-6
    ISBN (Print)978-3-319-48748-9
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 20 Oct 2017

    Publication series

    NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
    PublisherSpringer
    Volume10043
    ISSN (Print)0302-9743
    ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

    Keywords

    • Approximation
    • Bottleneck congestion games
    • Complexity
    • Congestion games
    • Convergence
    • Existence
    • Pure Nash equilibrium

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