Congestion games with mixed objectives

Matthias Feldotto, Lennart Leder, Alexander Skopalik

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We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games and its bottleneck variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to model network scenarios in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike. We characterize the (non-)existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE), the convergence of improvement dynamics, the quality of equilibria and show the complexity of the decision problem. For games that do not possess PNE we give bounds on the approximation ratio of approximate pure Nash equilibria.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1145-1167
Number of pages23
JournalJournal of combinatorial optimization
Issue number4
Early online date20 Oct 2017
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2018


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