Cooperation in capital deposits

Peter Borm, Anja De Waegenaere, Carles Rafels, Jeroen Suijs, Stef Tijs, Judith B. Timmer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The rate of return earned on a deposit can depend on its term, the amount of money invested in it, or both. Most banks, for example, offer a higher interest rate for longer term deposits. This implies that if one individual has capital available for investment now, but needs it in the next period, whereas the opposite holds for another individual, then they can both benefit from cooperation since it allows them to invest in a longer term deposit. A similar situation arises when the rate of return on a deposit depends on the amount of capital invested in it. Although the benefits of such cooperative behavior may seem obvious to all individuals, the actual participation of an individual depends on what part of the revenues he eventually receives. The allocation of the jointly earned benefits to the investors thus plays an important part in the stability of the cooperation. This paper provides a game theoretical analysis of this allocation problem. Several classes of corresponding deposit games are introduced. For each class, necessary conditions for a nonempty core are provided, and allocation rules that yield core-allocations are examined.
Original languageUndefined
Article number10.1007/PL00013352
Pages (from-to)265-281
Number of pages17
JournalOR Spectrum = OR Spektrum
Volume23
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 May 2001

Keywords

  • EWI-18035
  • METIS-212723
  • Cooperative game theory
  • Capital deposits
  • IR-72386

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