Cores of games with restricted cooperation

U. Faigle

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

56 Citations (Scopus)
65 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Games with restricted cooperation are cooperativeN-person games with sidepayments, where the collection of feasible coalitions need not comprise all subsets of players and thus is restricted. We study balanced and completely balanced games in this context and derive the corresponding core theorems from a sandwich theorem for set functions within the setting of linear programming. In particular, we discuss general convex games, which Edmonds and Giles (1977) have shown to be of particular importance also in combinatorial optimization.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)405-422
JournalZeitschrift für Operations Research
Volume33
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1989

Keywords

  • METIS-306402
  • IR-92533

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