Customer and cost sharing in a Jackson network

Judith Timmer; Willem R.W. Scheinhardt

doi:10.1142/S0219198918500020

Customer and cost sharing in a Jackson network

Judith Timmer, Willem R.W. Scheinhardt

Stochastic Operations Research

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

154 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

In this paper we consider a Jackson network of independent service stations. To improve upon the total expected waiting time, the stations may redistribute the total arrival rate of customers over all queues. We investigate this situation by means of arrival rate games. These are cooperative TU cost games in which the stations are the players and the total cost of a coalition is linear in the total expected waiting time. We show that these games are totally balanced; cooperation is beneficial to all stations. Further, we provide a tailor-made cost allocation rule that belongs to the core of the game.

Original language	English
Article number	1850002
Number of pages	10
Journal	International game theory review
Volume	20
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198918500020
Publication status	Published - 29 Mar 2018

Keywords

Jackson network
Customer sharing
Cooperative game
Cost allocation

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10.1142/S0219198918500020

2018-XTimmerScheinhardtAccepted author version, 232 KB

5 Citations
1 Report

Customer and cost sharing in a Jackson network
Timmer, J. B. & Scheinhardt, W. R. W., 30 Mar 2017, Enschede: University of Twente. 10 p. (Memorandum / Department of Applied Mathematics; no. 2060)
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AB - In this paper we consider a Jackson network of independent service stations. To improve upon the total expected waiting time, the stations may redistribute the total arrival rate of customers over all queues. We investigate this situation by means of arrival rate games. These are cooperative TU cost games in which the stations are the players and the total cost of a coalition is linear in the total expected waiting time. We show that these games are totally balanced; cooperation is beneficial to all stations. Further, we provide a tailor-made cost allocation rule that belongs to the core of the game.

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KW - Customer sharing

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KW - Cost allocation

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Customer and cost sharing in a Jackson network

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Keywords

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Customer and cost sharing in a Jackson network

Cite this