DAG-based attack and defense modeling: don’t miss the forest for the attack trees

Barbara Kordy, Ludovic Piètre-Cambacédès, Patrick Schweitzer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

132 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper presents the current state of the art on attack and defense modeling approaches that are based on directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). DAGs allow for a hierarchical decomposition of complex scenarios into simple, easily understandable and quantifiable actions. Methods based on threat trees and Bayesian networks are two well-known approaches to security modeling. However there exist more than 30 DAG-based methodologies, each having different features and goals. The objective of this survey is to summarize the existing methodologies, compare their features, and propose a taxonomy of the described formalisms. This article also supports the selection of an adequate modeling technique depending on user requirements.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-38-
Number of pages38
JournalComputer science review
Volume13-14
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2015
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • IR-91616
  • Security measures
  • Graphical models for security
  • EC Grant Agreement nr.: FP7/2007-2013
  • Quantitative and qualitative security assessment
  • EWI-24995
  • Attack trees
  • Attack and defense modeling
  • Bayesian Networks
  • EC Grant Agreement nr.: FP7/318003
  • METIS-305992

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'DAG-based attack and defense modeling: don’t miss the forest for the attack trees'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this