### Abstract

Original language | Undefined |
---|---|

Pages | 136-147 |

Number of pages | 12 |

DOIs | |

Publication status | Published - Jun 2006 |

Event | 10th Scandinavian Workshop on Algorithm Theory, SWAT 2006 - Riga, Latvia Duration: 6 Jul 2006 → 8 Jul 2006 Conference number: 10 |

### Conference

Conference | 10th Scandinavian Workshop on Algorithm Theory, SWAT 2006 |
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Abbreviated title | SWAT 2006 |

Country | Latvia |

City | Riga |

Period | 6/07/06 → 8/07/06 |

### Keywords

- IR-62214
- EWI-12117

### Cite this

*Decentralization and mechanism design for online machine scheduling*. 136-147. Paper presented at 10th Scandinavian Workshop on Algorithm Theory, SWAT 2006, Riga, Latvia. https://doi.org/10.1007/11785293_15

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**Decentralization and mechanism design for online machine scheduling.** / Arge, Lars (Editor); Heydenreich, Birgit; Müller, Rudolf; Freivalds, Rusins (Editor); Uetz, Marc Jochen.

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › Academic › peer-review

TY - CONF

T1 - Decentralization and mechanism design for online machine scheduling

AU - Heydenreich, Birgit

AU - Müller, Rudolf

AU - Uetz, Marc Jochen

A2 - Arge, Lars

A2 - Freivalds, Rusins

PY - 2006/6

Y1 - 2006/6

N2 - We study the online version of the classical parallel machine scheduling problem to minimize the total weighted completion time from a new perspective: We assume that the data of each job, namely its release date $r_j$, its processing time $p_j$ and its weight $w_j$ is only known to the job itself, but not to the system. Furthermore, we assume a decentralized setting where jobs choose the machine on which they want to be processed themselves. We study this problem from the perspective of algorithmic mechanism design. We introduce the concept of a myopic best response equilibrium, a concept weaker than the dominant strategy equilibrium, but appropriate for online problems. We present a polynomial time, online scheduling mechanism that, assuming rational behavior of jobs, results in an equilibrium schedule that is 3.281-competitive. The mechanism deploys an online payment scheme that induces rational jobs to truthfully report their private data. We also show that the underlying local scheduling policy cannot be extended to a mechanism where truthful reports constitute a dominant strategy equilibrium.

AB - We study the online version of the classical parallel machine scheduling problem to minimize the total weighted completion time from a new perspective: We assume that the data of each job, namely its release date $r_j$, its processing time $p_j$ and its weight $w_j$ is only known to the job itself, but not to the system. Furthermore, we assume a decentralized setting where jobs choose the machine on which they want to be processed themselves. We study this problem from the perspective of algorithmic mechanism design. We introduce the concept of a myopic best response equilibrium, a concept weaker than the dominant strategy equilibrium, but appropriate for online problems. We present a polynomial time, online scheduling mechanism that, assuming rational behavior of jobs, results in an equilibrium schedule that is 3.281-competitive. The mechanism deploys an online payment scheme that induces rational jobs to truthfully report their private data. We also show that the underlying local scheduling policy cannot be extended to a mechanism where truthful reports constitute a dominant strategy equilibrium.

KW - IR-62214

KW - EWI-12117

U2 - 10.1007/11785293_15

DO - 10.1007/11785293_15

M3 - Paper

SP - 136

EP - 147

ER -