Defeating MageCart Attacks in a NAISS Way

Catalin Rus*, Dipti Kapoor Sarmah*, Mohammed El-hajj*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterAcademicpeer-review

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Abstract

MageCart attacks pose a security threat to E-commerce platforms by using e-skimmers to steal payment details. Image steganography is used by attackers to conceal e-skimmers, making detection challenging. Existing solutions have limitations, such as incompatibility or insufficient functionality. This research proposes NAISS, a server-side middlebox solution that leverages digital signatures to filter unauthorized images without requiring client-side modifications. The proof-of-concept implementation demonstrates the efficacy of NAISS, filtering 100% of state of the art stegoimages, while indicating areas for further improvement.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 20th International Conference on Security and Cryptography (SECRYPT 2023)
EditorsSabrina De Capitani di Vimercati, Pierangela Samarati
Place of PublicationSetúbal, Portugal
PublisherSCITEPRESS
Pages691-697
Number of pages7
Volume1
ISBN (Electronic)978-989-758-666-8
ISBN (Print)9789897586668
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2023
Event20th International Conference on Security and Cryptography, SECRYPT 2023 - Rome, Italy
Duration: 10 Jul 202312 Jul 2023
Conference number: 20

Conference

Conference20th International Conference on Security and Cryptography, SECRYPT 2023
Abbreviated titleSECRYPT 2023
Country/TerritoryItaly
CityRome
Period10/07/2312/07/23

Keywords

  • Digital Signatures
  • E-commerce
  • E-skimmers
  • Image Steganography
  • MageCart
  • Middlebox
  • Network Filter

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