Do we have moral duties towards information objects?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, a critique will be developed and an alternative proposed to Luciano Floridi’s approach to Information Ethics (IE). IE is a macroethical theory that is to both serve as a foundation for computer ethics and to guide our overall moral attitude towards the world. The central claims of IE are that everything that exists can be described as an information object, and that all information objects, qua information objects, have intrinsic value and are therefore deserving of moral respect. In my critique of IE, I will argue that Floridi has presented no convincing arguments that everything that exists has some minimal amount of intrinsic value. I will argue, however, that his theory could be salvaged in large part if it were modified from a value-based into a respect-based theory, according to which many (but not all) inanimate things in the world deserve moral respect, not because of intrinsic value, but because of their (potential) extrinsic, instrumental or emotional value for persons.
Original languageUndefined
Pages (from-to)109-114
Number of pages6
JournalEthics and information technology
Volume10
Issue number2-3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008

Keywords

  • IR-71149
  • METIS-252840
  • Information ethics - intrinsic value - respect - informational realism - Object-Oriented Programming - bioethics - environmental ethics - artifacts - anthropocentrism

Cite this