We study a channel through which politicians use corporate taxes to extract firm’s resources. We find that politically-connected firms pay higher taxes than their non-connected counterparts. Using election as an exogenous shock, we also observe that politically-connected firms pay higher taxes during election years to support the incumbent political regime. The results of the study indicate that favorable economic indicators, e.g. tax revenue, are vitally important to politicians and provide rent seeking incentive to achieve their political objective, e.g. gaining votes.
|Number of pages||38|
|Publication status||Published - 29 May 2019|
|Event||42nd Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association, EAA 2019 - Aliathon Holiday Village Hotel, Paphos, Cyprus|
Duration: 29 May 2019 → 31 May 2019
Conference number: 42
|Conference||42nd Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association, EAA 2019|
|Period||29/05/19 → 31/05/19|
- political connections
- corporate taxes
Arifin, T., Kabir, R., & Hasan, I. (2019). Does it cost to be politically connected? An examination of the grabbing hand hypothesis using corporate taxes. Paper presented at 42nd Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association, EAA 2019, Paphos, Cyprus.