Empirical evidence of paradoxes of voting in Dutch elections

Ad M.A. van Deemen, Noël P. Vergunst

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademic

24 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we analyze four national elections held in 1982, 1986, 1989 and 1994 in the Netherlands on the occurrence of the Condorcet paradox. In addition, we investigate these elections on the occurrence of three so-called majority-plurality paradoxes. The first paradox states that a party having a majority over another party may receive less seats. The second states that a Condorcet winner may not receive the largest number of seats and even may not receive a seat at all. The third says that the majority relation may be the reverse of the ranking of parties in terms of numbers of seats.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)475-490
JournalPublic choice
Volume97
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1998
Externally publishedYes

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voting
election
evidence
Netherlands
Elections
Empirical evidence
Paradox
Voting
Seat

Keywords

  • Empirical evidence
  • Public finance
  • National election
  • Condorcet winner
  • Majority relation

Cite this

van Deemen, Ad M.A. ; Vergunst, Noël P. / Empirical evidence of paradoxes of voting in Dutch elections. In: Public choice. 1998 ; Vol. 97, No. 3. pp. 475-490.
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Empirical evidence of paradoxes of voting in Dutch elections. / van Deemen, Ad M.A.; Vergunst, Noël P.

In: Public choice, Vol. 97, No. 3, 1998, p. 475-490.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademic

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AB - In this paper we analyze four national elections held in 1982, 1986, 1989 and 1994 in the Netherlands on the occurrence of the Condorcet paradox. In addition, we investigate these elections on the occurrence of three so-called majority-plurality paradoxes. The first paradox states that a party having a majority over another party may receive less seats. The second states that a Condorcet winner may not receive the largest number of seats and even may not receive a seat at all. The third says that the majority relation may be the reverse of the ranking of parties in terms of numbers of seats.

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