Endogenous formation of cooperation structure in TU games

Anna Khmelnitskaya, Elena Parilina, Artem Sedakov

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterAcademicpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Our main goal is to provide comparative analysis of several procedures for endogenous dynamic formation of the cooperation structure in TU games. In the paper we consider two approaches to endogenous graph formation based on sequential link announcement and revision. For the evaluation of the pros and cons when adding of a new link is in question, along with the Myerson value we consider also the average tree solution and the centrality rewarding Shapley and Myerson values, recently introduced.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationFrontiers of Dynamic Games
Subtitle of host publicationGame Theory and Management, St. Petersburg, 2018
EditorsLeon A. Petrosyan, Vladimir V. Mazalov, Nikolay A. Zenkevich
PublisherSpringer
Chapter4
Pages49-64
Number of pages16
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-030-23699-1
ISBN (Print)978-3-030-23698-4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 26 Sep 2019
Externally publishedYes
Event12th International Conference on Game Theory and Management, GTM 2018 - Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation
Duration: 27 Jun 201829 Jun 2018
Conference number: 12

Publication series

NameStatic & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications
PublisherSpringer Nature
ISSN (Print)2363-8516

Seminar

Seminar12th International Conference on Game Theory and Management, GTM 2018
Abbreviated titleGTM 2018
CountryRussian Federation
CitySaint Petersburg
Period27/06/1829/06/18

Keywords

  • Average tree solution
  • Centrality rewarding Shapley and Myerson values
  • Communication graph
  • Graph formation
  • Myerson value
  • Subgame perfect equilibrium
  • TU game

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