Endogenous formation of cooperation structure in TU games with major player

Anna Borisovna Khmelnitskaya, Elena Parilina, Artem Sedakov

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Abstract

Our main goal is to provide comparative analysis of several procedures for endogenous dynamic formation of the cooperation structure in TU games with a major player. In the paper we consider both approaches to endogenous graph formation, of Aumann and Myerson (1988), and of Petrosyan and Sedakov (2014). For the evaluation of the pros and cons when adding of a new link is in question, along with the Myerson value we consider also the average tree solution introduced by Herings, van der Laan, Talman and Yang (2010) and the centrality rewarding Shapley and Myerson values, recently introduced by Khmelnitskaya, van der Laan and Talman (2016).
Original languageEnglish
PublisherUniversity of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics
Number of pages19
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2018

Publication series

NameTW-Memoranda
PublisherUniversity of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics
No.2063
ISSN (Print)1874-4850

Keywords

  • Graph games;
  • Myerson value
  • Average tree solution
  • Centrality re- warding Shapley value
  • Graph formation
  • Subgame perfect equilibrium

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    Khmelnitskaya, A. B., Parilina, E., & Sedakov, A. (2018). Endogenous formation of cooperation structure in TU games with major player. (TW-Memoranda; No. 2063). University of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics.