Endogenous formation of cooperation structure in TU games with major player

Anna Borisovna Khmelnitskaya, Elena Parilina, Artem Sedakov

Research output: Book/ReportReport

Abstract

Our main goal is to provide comparative analysis of several procedures for endogenous dynamic formation of the cooperation structure in TU games with a major player. In the paper we consider both approaches to endogenous graph formation, of Aumann and Myerson (1988), and of Petrosyan and Sedakov (2014). For the evaluation of the pros and cons when adding of a new link is in question, along with the Myerson value we consider also the average tree solution introduced by Herings, van der Laan, Talman and Yang (2010) and the centrality rewarding Shapley and Myerson values, recently introduced by Khmelnitskaya, van der Laan and Talman (2016).
LanguageEnglish
PublisherUniversity of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics
Number of pages19
StatePublished - Feb 2018

Publication series

NameTW-Memoranda
PublisherUniversity of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics
No.2063
ISSN (Print)1874-4850

Fingerprint

Myerson value
TU game
Evaluation
Centrality
Graph
Comparative analysis
Shapley value

Keywords

  • Graph games;
  • Myerson value
  • Average tree solution
  • Centrality re- warding Shapley value
  • Graph formation
  • Subgame perfect equilibrium

Cite this

Khmelnitskaya, A. B., Parilina, E., & Sedakov, A. (2018). Endogenous formation of cooperation structure in TU games with major player. (TW-Memoranda; No. 2063). University of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics.
Khmelnitskaya, Anna Borisovna ; Parilina, Elena ; Sedakov, Artem. / Endogenous formation of cooperation structure in TU games with major player. University of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics, 2018. 19 p. (TW-Memoranda; 2063).
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Khmelnitskaya, AB, Parilina, E & Sedakov, A 2018, Endogenous formation of cooperation structure in TU games with major player. TW-Memoranda, no. 2063, University of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics.

Endogenous formation of cooperation structure in TU games with major player. / Khmelnitskaya, Anna Borisovna; Parilina, Elena; Sedakov, Artem.

University of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics, 2018. 19 p. (TW-Memoranda; No. 2063).

Research output: Book/ReportReport

TY - BOOK

T1 - Endogenous formation of cooperation structure in TU games with major player

AU - Khmelnitskaya,Anna Borisovna

AU - Parilina,Elena

AU - Sedakov,Artem

PY - 2018/2

Y1 - 2018/2

N2 - Our main goal is to provide comparative analysis of several procedures for endogenous dynamic formation of the cooperation structure in TU games with a major player. In the paper we consider both approaches to endogenous graph formation, of Aumann and Myerson (1988), and of Petrosyan and Sedakov (2014). For the evaluation of the pros and cons when adding of a new link is in question, along with the Myerson value we consider also the average tree solution introduced by Herings, van der Laan, Talman and Yang (2010) and the centrality rewarding Shapley and Myerson values, recently introduced by Khmelnitskaya, van der Laan and Talman (2016).

AB - Our main goal is to provide comparative analysis of several procedures for endogenous dynamic formation of the cooperation structure in TU games with a major player. In the paper we consider both approaches to endogenous graph formation, of Aumann and Myerson (1988), and of Petrosyan and Sedakov (2014). For the evaluation of the pros and cons when adding of a new link is in question, along with the Myerson value we consider also the average tree solution introduced by Herings, van der Laan, Talman and Yang (2010) and the centrality rewarding Shapley and Myerson values, recently introduced by Khmelnitskaya, van der Laan and Talman (2016).

KW - Graph games;

KW - Myerson value

KW - Average tree solution

KW - Centrality re- warding Shapley value

KW - Graph formation

KW - Subgame perfect equilibrium

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Khmelnitskaya AB, Parilina E, Sedakov A. Endogenous formation of cooperation structure in TU games with major player. University of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics, 2018. 19 p. (TW-Memoranda; 2063).