Energy-Efficient Link-Layer Jamming Attacks against Wireless Sensor Network MAC Protocols

Y.W. Law; L.F.W. van Hoesel; J.M. Doumen; Pieter H. Hartel; Paul J.M. Havinga

doi:10.1145/1102219.1102234

Energy-Efficient Link-Layer Jamming Attacks against Wireless Sensor Network MAC Protocols

Y.W. Law, L.F.W. van Hoesel, J.M. Doumen, Pieter H. Hartel, Paul J.M. Havinga

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

76 Citations (Scopus)

297 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

A typical wireless sensor node has little protection against radio jamming. The situation becomes worse if energy efficient jamming can be achieved by exploiting knowledge of the data link layer. Encrypting the packets may help prevent the jammer from taking actions based on the content of the packets, but the temporal arrangement of the packets induced by the nature of the protocol might unravel patterns that the jammer can take advantage of even when the packets are encrypted. By looking at the packet interarrival times in three representative MAC protocols, S-MAC, LMAC and B-MAC, we derive several jamming attacks that allow the jammer to jam S-MAC, LMAC and B-MAC energy-efficiently. The jamming attacks are based on realistic assumptions. The algorithms, using expectation maximization in case of S-MAC, or K-means in case of LMAC, or low-power listening in case of B-MAC, are described in detail and simulated. The effectiveness and efficiency of the attacks are examined. The result of this investigation provides new insights into the security considerations of MAC protocols.

Original language	Undefined
Title of host publication	3rd ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks (SASN)
Editors	V. Atluri, P. Samarati, P. Ning, W. Du
Place of Publication	New York
Publisher	ACM Press
Pages	76-88
Number of pages	13
ISBN (Print)	1-59593-227-5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/1102219.1102234
Publication status	Published - Nov 2005

Publication series

Name
Publisher	ACM Press

Keywords

EWI-704
CAES-PS: Pervasive Systems
IR-54545
METIS-228801
SCS-Cybersecurity

Access to Document

10.1145/1102219.1102234

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open
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http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1102219.1102234

Cite this

Law, Y. W., van Hoesel, L. F. W., Doumen, J. M., Hartel, P. H., & Havinga, P. J. M. (2005). Energy-Efficient Link-Layer Jamming Attacks against Wireless Sensor Network MAC Protocols. In V. Atluri, P. Samarati, P. Ning, & W. Du (Eds.), 3rd ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks (SASN) (pp. 76-88). New York: ACM Press. https://doi.org/10.1145/1102219.1102234

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abstract = "A typical wireless sensor node has little protection against radio jamming. The situation becomes worse if energy efficient jamming can be achieved by exploiting knowledge of the data link layer. Encrypting the packets may help prevent the jammer from taking actions based on the content of the packets, but the temporal arrangement of the packets induced by the nature of the protocol might unravel patterns that the jammer can take advantage of even when the packets are encrypted. By looking at the packet interarrival times in three representative MAC protocols, S-MAC, LMAC and B-MAC, we derive several jamming attacks that allow the jammer to jam S-MAC, LMAC and B-MAC energy-efficiently. The jamming attacks are based on realistic assumptions. The algorithms, using expectation maximization in case of S-MAC, or K-means in case of LMAC, or low-power listening in case of B-MAC, are described in detail and simulated. The effectiveness and efficiency of the attacks are examined. The result of this investigation provides new insights into the security considerations of MAC protocols.",

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language = "Undefined",

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Energy-Efficient Link-Layer Jamming Attacks against Wireless Sensor Network MAC Protocols. / Law, Y.W.; van Hoesel, L.F.W.; Doumen, J.M.; Hartel, Pieter H.; Havinga, Paul J.M.

3rd ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks (SASN). ed. / V. Atluri; P. Samarati; P. Ning; W. Du. New York : ACM Press, 2005. p. 76-88.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

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