Experimental evidence on deliberate misrepresentation in referendum contingent evaluation

Philippe Polome

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The paper presents an experiment on deliberate misrepresentation in referendum contingent valuation (RCV) surveys. The experiment consists in inducing willingness to pay (WTP) for a credible laboratory public good with an uncertain cost and asking subjects to vote in an advisory referendum on the provision of that good without knowing the actual provision rule. Only half the participants voted truthfully, but their decision whether to reveal truthfully was not related to the size of the willingness to pay. A second experiment shows that this last result may be due to the advisory nature of the provision rule.
Original languageUndefined
Pages (from-to)387-401
JournalJournal of economic behavior & organization
Volume52
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2003

Keywords

  • Deliberate misrepresentation
  • Induced willingness to pay
  • Provision rule
  • IR-58665
  • Laboratory experiment
  • METIS-213278
  • Referendum contingent valuation

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