Extensions of Hart and Mas-Colell's consistency to efficient, linear, and symmetric values for TU-games

Theo Driessen, T. Radzik

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

By Hart and Mas-Colell’s axiomatization, it is known that the Shapley value for TU-games is fully characterized by its 1-standardness for two-person games and its consistency property with respect to a particular reduced game. In the framework of TU-games, this paper establishes a similar axiomatization (with reference to some kind of consistency and standardness for two-person games) for values that verify efficiency, linearity, and symmetry. The fundamental idea in this unified consistency approach involves the introduction of a new type of reduced game. The construction of this game takes into account, besides the value itself, the probabilities of two events that a removed player joins or does not join a proposed coalition. Although the reduced game varies whenever the efficient, linear, and symmetric value varies, an operational criterion is presented to determine the appropriate reduced game by solving an associated system of linear equations recursively. Finally, the impact of the unified consistency approach is illustrated in the context of several known values, in particular the least square values and the Shapley value.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationICM Millennium Lectures on Games
EditorsL.A. Petrosyan, D.W.K. Yeung
Place of PublicationHeidelberg, Germany
PublisherSpringer
Pages147-165
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-662-05219-8
ISBN (Print)978-3-642-05618-5
Publication statusPublished - 2003
EventInternational Congress of Mathematicians 2002 - Beijing, China
Duration: 20 Aug 200228 Aug 2002

Conference

ConferenceInternational Congress of Mathematicians 2002
Abbreviated titleICM 2002
CountryChina
CityBeijing
Period20/08/0228/08/02

Keywords

  • METIS-213529

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Extensions of Hart and Mas-Colell's consistency to efficient, linear, and symmetric values for TU-games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this