Extensions of the Shapley Value and their Characterizations

Y. Feng

Research output: ThesisPhD Thesis - Research UT, graduation UT

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Abstract

In this thesis we consider cooperative games with transferable utilities, which are also called TU games. A TU game consists of a finite set of players, and a characteristic function from the set of all possible coalitions to a set of payments. The characteristic function describes how much a set of players can gain by forming a coalition. The main assumption in cooperative game theory is that the grand coalition, i.e., the set containing all involved players, will form. Thus the challenge is how to allocate the payoff of the grand coalition to all players in a fair way. Different definitions of fairness may result in different allocation rules. We aim to characterize some well-known allocation rules (solutions) and their generalizations in different models for cooperative games.
Original languageUndefined
Awarding Institution
  • University of Twente
Supervisors/Advisors
  • Uetz, Marc Jochen, Supervisor
  • Driessen, Theo, Advisor
  • Still, Georg Josef, Advisor
Thesis sponsors
Award date28 Aug 2013
Place of PublicationEnschede
Publisher
Print ISBNs978-90-365-0004-3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 28 Aug 2013

Keywords

  • EWI-23966
  • IR-86971
  • METIS-297236

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