TY - JOUR
T1 - Fast and Accurate Likelihood Ratio Based Biometric Verification Secure Against Malicious Adversaries
AU - Bassit, Amina
AU - Hahn, Florian
AU - Peeters, Joep
AU - Kevenaar, Tom
AU - Veldhuis, Raymond
AU - Peter, Andreas
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
Author
Financial transaction number:
342151421
PY - 2021/10/26
Y1 - 2021/10/26
N2 - Biometric verification has been widely deployed in current authentication solutions as it proves the physical presence of individuals. Several solutions have been developed to protect the sensitive biometric data in such systems that provide security against honest-but-curious (a.k.a. semi-honest) attackers. However, in practice, attackers typically do not act honestly and multiple studies have shown severe biometric information leakage in such honest-but-curious solutions when considering dishonest, malicious attackers. In this paper, we propose a provably secure biometric verification protocol to withstand malicious attackers and prevent biometric data from any leakage. The proposed protocol is based on a homomorphically encrypted log likelihood-ratio (HELR) classifier that supports any biometric modality (e.g., face, fingerprint, dynamic signature, etc.) encoded as a fixed-length real-valued feature vector. The HELR classifier performs an accurate and fast biometric recognition. Furthermore, our protocol, which is secure against malicious adversaries, is designed from a protocol secure against semi-honest adversaries enhanced by zero-knowledge proofs. We evaluate both protocols for various security levels and record a sub-second speed (between 0.37s and 0.88s) for the protocol secure against semi-honest adversaries and between 0.95s and 2.50s for the protocol secure against malicious adversaries.
AB - Biometric verification has been widely deployed in current authentication solutions as it proves the physical presence of individuals. Several solutions have been developed to protect the sensitive biometric data in such systems that provide security against honest-but-curious (a.k.a. semi-honest) attackers. However, in practice, attackers typically do not act honestly and multiple studies have shown severe biometric information leakage in such honest-but-curious solutions when considering dishonest, malicious attackers. In this paper, we propose a provably secure biometric verification protocol to withstand malicious attackers and prevent biometric data from any leakage. The proposed protocol is based on a homomorphically encrypted log likelihood-ratio (HELR) classifier that supports any biometric modality (e.g., face, fingerprint, dynamic signature, etc.) encoded as a fixed-length real-valued feature vector. The HELR classifier performs an accurate and fast biometric recognition. Furthermore, our protocol, which is secure against malicious adversaries, is designed from a protocol secure against semi-honest adversaries enhanced by zero-knowledge proofs. We evaluate both protocols for various security levels and record a sub-second speed (between 0.37s and 0.88s) for the protocol secure against semi-honest adversaries and between 0.95s and 2.50s for the protocol secure against malicious adversaries.
KW - Authentication
KW - Biometric verification
KW - Biometrics (access control)
KW - Feature extraction
KW - Probes
KW - Protocols
KW - Secure two-party computation
KW - Security
KW - Semi-honest and malicious models
KW - Servers
KW - Threshold homomorphic encryption
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85118585826&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/TIFS.2021.3122823
DO - 10.1109/TIFS.2021.3122823
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85118585826
SN - 1556-6013
VL - 16
SP - 5045
EP - 5060
JO - IEEE transactions on information forensics and security
JF - IEEE transactions on information forensics and security
ER -