### Abstract

We introduce the ray-projection dynamics in evolutionary game
theory by employing a ray projection of the relative �tness (vector)
function both locally and globally. By global (local) ray projection we
mean a projection of the vector (close to the unit simplex) unto the unit
simplex along a ray through the origin. For these dynamics, we prove
that every interior evolutionarily stable strategy is an asymptotically
stable �xed point, and that every strict equilibrium is an evolutionarily
stable state and an evolutionarily stable equilibrium.
Then, we employ these projections on a set of functions related to
the relative �tness function which yields a class containing e.g., best-
response, logit, replicator, and Brown-Von-Neumann dynamics.

Original language | Undefined |
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Place of Publication | Enschede, the Netherlands |

Publisher | University of Twente |

Number of pages | 23 |

Publication status | Published - 30 Jan 2009 |

### Publication series

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Publisher | University of Twente |

### Keywords

- IR-97453
- dynamic and evolutionary stability
- ray-projection dynamics
- Evolutionary games

## Cite this

Joosten, R. A. M. G., & Roorda, B. (2009).

*Generalized projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory*. Enschede, the Netherlands: University of Twente.