### Abstract

Original language | Undefined |
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Place of Publication | Enschede, the Netherlands |

Publisher | University of Twente |

Number of pages | 23 |

Publication status | Published - 30 Jan 2009 |

### Publication series

Name | |
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Publisher | University of Twente |

### Keywords

- IR-97453
- dynamic and evolutionary stability
- ray-projection dynamics
- Evolutionary games

### Cite this

*Generalized projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory*. Enschede, the Netherlands: University of Twente.

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*Generalized projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory*. University of Twente, Enschede, the Netherlands.

**Generalized projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory.** / Joosten, Reinoud A.M.G.; Roorda, Berend.

Research output: Book/Report › Report › Other research output

TY - BOOK

T1 - Generalized projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory

AU - Joosten, Reinoud A.M.G.

AU - Roorda, Berend

PY - 2009/1/30

Y1 - 2009/1/30

N2 - We introduce the ray-projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory by employing a ray projection of the relative �tness (vector) function both locally and globally. By global (local) ray projection we mean a projection of the vector (close to the unit simplex) unto the unit simplex along a ray through the origin. For these dynamics, we prove that every interior evolutionarily stable strategy is an asymptotically stable �xed point, and that every strict equilibrium is an evolutionarily stable state and an evolutionarily stable equilibrium. Then, we employ these projections on a set of functions related to the relative �tness function which yields a class containing e.g., best- response, logit, replicator, and Brown-Von-Neumann dynamics.

AB - We introduce the ray-projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory by employing a ray projection of the relative �tness (vector) function both locally and globally. By global (local) ray projection we mean a projection of the vector (close to the unit simplex) unto the unit simplex along a ray through the origin. For these dynamics, we prove that every interior evolutionarily stable strategy is an asymptotically stable �xed point, and that every strict equilibrium is an evolutionarily stable state and an evolutionarily stable equilibrium. Then, we employ these projections on a set of functions related to the relative �tness function which yields a class containing e.g., best- response, logit, replicator, and Brown-Von-Neumann dynamics.

KW - IR-97453

KW - dynamic and evolutionary stability

KW - ray-projection dynamics

KW - Evolutionary games

M3 - Report

BT - Generalized projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory

PB - University of Twente

CY - Enschede, the Netherlands

ER -