Ghost in the PLC: Designing an Undetectable Programmable Logic Controller Rootkit via Pin Control Attack

Ali Abbasi, Majid Hashemi

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

    41 Citations (Scopus)
    354 Downloads (Pure)

    Abstract

    Input/Output is the mechanisms through which embedded systems interact and control the outside world. Particularly when employed in mission critical systems, the I/O of embedded systems has to be both reliable and secure. Embedded system’s I/O is controlled by a pin based approach. In this paper, we investigate the security implications of embedded system’s pin control. In particular, we show how an attacker can tamper with the integrity and availability of an embedded system’s I/O by exploiting cerain pin control operations and the lack of hardware interrupts associated to them.
    Original languageUndefined
    Title of host publicationBlack Hat Europe
    Place of PublicationUnited Kingdom
    PublisherBlack Hat
    Pages1-35
    Number of pages35
    ISBN (Print)not assigned
    Publication statusPublished - 3 Nov 2016

    Publication series

    Name
    PublisherBlack Hat

    Keywords

    • SCS-Cybersecurity
    • PLC
    • Pin
    • SoC
    • EC Grant Agreement nr.: FP7/607093
    • IR-102383
    • Exploit
    • Attack
    • Rootkit
    • METIS-319497
    • EWI-27470

    Cite this

    Abbasi, A., & Hashemi, M. (2016). Ghost in the PLC: Designing an Undetectable Programmable Logic Controller Rootkit via Pin Control Attack. In Black Hat Europe (pp. 1-35). United Kingdom: Black Hat.