Glitch Epistemology and the Question of (Artificial) Intelligence: Perceptions, Encounters, Subjectivities

Casey Lynch*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

    5 Citations (Scopus)
    182 Downloads (Pure)


    Reflecting on Leszczynski and Elwood's theorization of glitch epistemology, this commentary argues for epistemological approaches to the question of (artificial) intelligence in geography focused around perceptions, encounters, and subjectivities. Such an approach denies technologies marketed as AI or otherwise as “smart” the ontological status ascribed to them, instead investigating how particular technologies may be perceived as intelligent within the context of contingent and situated encounters with always differentiated and differentiating subjects. Glitch and related epistemological approaches reorient attention to the uneven production of desire and expectations for particular kinds of technologies and create opportunities to radically reimagine our relationships to them.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)379-383
    Number of pages5
    JournalDialogues in Human Geography
    Issue number3
    Early online date23 May 2022
    Publication statusPublished - Nov 2022


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