Global Akteure in der Kaspischen Region, Ölfirmen und Ölexportwege

This study analyses the negotiations of transnational oil export routes between 1993 and 2003 which aim to connect the Caspian region with the world oil market. The focus of this thesis is on the different distribution of costs and profits between involved states and oil companies with regard to various pipeline projects. By analysing two oil pipeline projects, the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline and the export route of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, it is demonstrated methodologically that the independent variables “oil price” and “structure of the production consortium” are responsible for a stronger enforcement of private vis-à-vis state preferences. The following two major findings have been generated: Firstly, multinational consortia strengthen the oil companies as a group to enforce their preferences. Secondly, the oil price influences the behaviour of state actors to a similar extent than private actors in case their state budgets are heavily dependent on oil rents. The theoretical background of this study refers to the International Political Economy approach by Susan Strange.