Graph-restricted games with coalition structure

L.A. Petrosyan (Editor), Anna Borisovna Khmelnitskaya, N.A. Zenkevich (Editor)

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperAcademic

25 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We consider a new model of a TU game endowed with both coalition and two-level cooperation structures that applies to various network situations. The approach to the value is close to that of both Myerson (1977) and Aumann and Drèze (1974): it is based on ideas of component efficiency and of one or another deletion link property, and it treats an a priori union as a self-contained unit; moreover, our approach incorporates also the idea of the Owen’s quotient game property (1977). The axiomatically introduced values possess an explicit formula representation and in many cases can be quite simply computed. The results obtained are applied to the problem of sharing an international river among multiple users without international firms.
Original languageUndefined
Pages220-246
Number of pages27
Publication statusPublished - 2010
EventThird International Conference on Game Theory and Management - St. Petersburg, Russia
Duration: 24 Jun 200926 Jun 2009

Conference

ConferenceThird International Conference on Game Theory and Management
Period24/06/0926/06/09
Other24-26 June 2009

Keywords

  • IR-83397
  • Myerson value
  • Cooperation structure
  • Deletion link property
  • Owen value
  • Aumann-Drèze value
  • Coalition structure
  • TU game
  • Component efficiency

Cite this