Higher-order differential power analysis attacks are a serious threat for cryptographic hardware implementations. In particular, glitches in the circuit make it hard to protect the implementation with masking. The existing higher-order masking countermeasures that guarantee security in the presence of glitches use multi-party computation techniques and require a lot of resources in terms of circuit area and randomness. The Threshold Implementation method is also based on multi-party computation but it is more area and randomness efficient. Moreover, it typically requires less clock-cycles since all parties can operate simultaneously. However, so far it is only provable secure against 1st-order DPA. We address this gap and extend the Threshold Implementation technique to higher orders. We define generic constructions and prove their security. To illustrate the approach, we provide 1st, 2nd and 3rd-order DPA-resistant implementations of the block cipher KATAN- 32. Our analysis of 300 million power traces measured from an FPGA implementation supports the security proofs.
|Title of host publication||Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2014|
|Subtitle of host publication||20th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Kaoshiung, Taiwan, R.O.C., December 7-11, 2014, Proceedings|
|Editors||Palash Sarkar, Tetsu Iwata|
|Place of Publication||London|
|Number of pages||19|
|Publication status||Published - Dec 2014|
|Name||Lecture Notes in Computer Science|