Abstract
A cooperative bin packing game is an $N$-person game, where the player set $N$ consists of $k$ bins of capacity 1 each and $n$ items of sizes $a_1,\dots,a_n$. The value $v(S)$ of a coalition $S$ of players is defined to be the maximum total size of items in $S$ that can be packed into the bins of $S$. We analyze the integrality gap of the corresponding 0–1 integer program of the value $v(N)$, thereby presenting an alternative proof for the non-emptiness of the 1/3-core for all bin packing games. Further, we show how to improve this bound $\epsilon\leq1/3$ (slightly) and point out that the conclusion in Matsui (2000) [9] is wrong (claiming that the bound 1/3 was tight). We conjecture that the true best possible value is $\epsilon=1/7$. The results are obtained using a new “rounding technique‿ that we develop to derive good (integral) packings from given fractional ones.
Original language | Undefined |
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Pages (from-to) | 360-363 |
Number of pages | 4 |
Journal | Operations research letters |
Volume | 40 |
Issue number | 5 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Sept 2012 |
Keywords
- EWI-22494
- Integrality gap
- Core
- Taxation rate
- METIS-289774
- IR-82139
- Bin packing