Interests, legitimacy, and constitutional choice: The extension of the codecision procedure in Amsterdam

B. Steunenberg, Antoaneta Dimitrova

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    Abstract

    In this paper we address the issue of the steady and significant increase in the scope of the codecision procedure and the motivation of the member states for increasing the power of the European Parliament. Using a rational choice framework we argue that the important variable in the assessment of the changes in the decision making procedures is the expected benefit from the various legislative procedures to political actors, since these procedures are used for a multitude of issues. Subsequently, we examine the issue areas to which codecision has been extended by the Amsterdam Treaty. We show why the member states changed legislative procedures in some issue areas, as embodied in the respective treaty articles, while in other areas they kept the procedure the same.
    Original languageEnglish
    Number of pages33
    Publication statusPublished - 26 Mar 1999
    EventECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops 1999 - Universität Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany
    Duration: 26 Mar 199931 Mar 1999

    Conference

    ConferenceECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops 1999
    CountryGermany
    CityMannheim
    Period26/03/9931/03/99

    Keywords

    • METIS-102408

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