In this paper we address the issue of the steady and significant increase in the scope of the codecision procedure and the motivation of the member states for increasing the power of the European Parliament. Using a rational choice framework we argue that the important variable in the assessment of the changes in the decision making procedures is the expected benefit from the various legislative procedures to political actors, since these procedures are used for a multitude of issues. Subsequently, we examine the issue areas to which codecision has been extended by the Amsterdam Treaty. We show why the member states changed legislative procedures in some issue areas, as embodied in the respective treaty articles, while in other areas they kept the procedure the same.
|Number of pages||33|
|Publication status||Published - 26 Mar 1999|
|Event||ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops 1999 - Universität Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany|
Duration: 26 Mar 1999 → 31 Mar 1999
|Conference||ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops 1999|
|Period||26/03/99 → 31/03/99|