Liberal economic nationalism, financial stability, and Commission leniency in Banking Union

Shawn Donnelly* (Corresponding Author)

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)
73 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

This paper demonstrates that protection and promotion of insolvent banks remains a high priority for national authorities in Europe, and the Commission partially accommodates these impulses in the desire to preserve national financial stability. Insolvent banks are kept alive despite Banking Union rules on resolution designed to facilitate their closure at the cost of private investors. Italian and Portuguese cases demonstrate that pressure to relax state aid rules is strongest where problems are the greatest. However, the long-term trend is still an incremental decrease in national leeway to protect and promote national bank ownership.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)159-173
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Economic Policy Reform
Volume21
Issue number2
Early online date10 Dec 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018

Keywords

  • UT-Hybrid-D
  • financial stability
  • protectionism
  • resolution
  • state aid
  • Banking Union
  • Ultrasound

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