Link-layer Jamming Attacks on S-MAC

Y.W. Law, Pieter H. Hartel, Jeremy den Hartog, Paul J.M. Havinga

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    Abstract

    We argue that among denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, link-layer jamming is a more attractive option to attackers than radio jamming is. By exploiting the semantics of the link-layer protocol (aka MAC protocol), an attacker can achieve better efficiency than blindly jamming the radio signals alone. In this paper, we investigate some jamming attacks on S-MAC, the level of effectiveness and efficiency the attacks can potentially achieve, and a countermeasure that can be implemented against one of these attacks.
    Original languageUndefined
    Place of PublicationEnschede
    PublisherCentre for Telematics and Information Technology (CTIT)
    Number of pages12
    Publication statusPublished - Dec 2004

    Publication series

    NameCTIT technical report series
    PublisherUniversity of Twente, Centre for Telematics and Information Technology (CTIT)
    No.CTIT-TR-04-52

    Keywords

    • SCS-Cybersecurity
    • IR-56983
    • CAES-PS: Pervasive Systems
    • EWI-5754

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