Mechanism Design for Decentralized Online Machine Scheduling

Birgit Heydenreich, Rudolf Müller, Marc Uetz

Research output: Book/ReportReportProfessional

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Traditional optimization models assume a central decision maker who optimizes a global system performance measure. However, problem data is often distributed among several agents, and agents take autonomous decisions. This gives incentives for strategic behavior of agents, possibly leading to sub-optimal system performance. Furthermore, in dynamic environments, machines are locally dispersed and administratively independent. Examples are found both in business and engineering applications. We investigate such issues for a parallel machine scheduling model where jobs arrive online over time. Instead of centrally assigning jobs to machines, each machine implements a local sequencing rule and jobs decide for machines themselves. In this context, we introduce the concept of a myopic best response equilibrium, a concept weaker than the classical dominant strategy equilibrium, but appropriate for online problems. Our main result is a polynomial time, online mechanism that |assuming rational behavior of jobs| results in an equilibrium schedule that is 3.281-competitive with respect to the maximal social welfare. This is only lightly worse than state-of-the-art algorithms with central coordination.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationEnschede
PublisherCentre for Telematics and Information Technology (CTIT)
Number of pages23
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2008

Publication series

NameCTIT Technical Report Series
PublisherUniversity of Twente, Center for Telematics and Information Technology (CTIT)
ISSN (Print)1381-3625


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