Multi-objective road pricing: A cooperative and competitive bilevel optimization approach

Anthony Ohazulike, Anthony Ohazulike, Michiel Bliemer, Georg J. Still, Eric C. van Berkum

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Abstract

Costs associated with traffic externalities such as congestion, air pollution, noise, safety, etcetera are becoming unbearable. The Braess paradox shows that combating congestion by adding infrastructure may not improve traffic conditions, and geographical and/or financial constraints may not allow infrastructure expansion. Road pricing presents an alternative to combat traffic externalities. The traditional way of road pricing, namely congestion charging, may create negative benefits for society. In this effect, we develop a flexible pricing scheme internalizing costs arising from all externalities. Using a game theoretical approach, we extend the single authority road pricing scheme to a pricing scheme with multiple authorities/regions (with likely contradicting objectives).
Original languageUndefined
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 11th Trail Congress
EditorsT.P. Alkim, T. Arentze
Place of PublicationDelft
PublisherTRAIL
Pages1-5
Number of pages5
ISBN (Print)978-90-5584-139-4
Publication statusPublished - 2010
Event11th International TRAIL Congress 2010: Connecting People - Integrating Expertise - Delft, Netherlands
Duration: 23 Nov 201024 Nov 2010
Conference number: 11

Publication series

Name
PublisherTRAIL Research School

Conference

Conference11th International TRAIL Congress 2010
CountryNetherlands
CityDelft
Period23/11/1024/11/10

Keywords

  • IR-79688
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Multi-objective optimization
  • Equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraint (EPEC)
  • Road pricing
  • EWI-21588
  • MSC-90C90
  • METIS-272967
  • mathematical program with equilibriumconstraints (MPEC)

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