Abstract
Costs associated with traffic externalities such as congestion, air pollution, noise, safety, etcetera are becoming unbearable. The Braess paradox shows that combating congestion by adding infrastructure may not improve traffic conditions, and geographical and/or financial constraints may not allow infrastructure expansion. Road pricing presents an alternative to combat traffic externalities. The traditional way of road pricing, namely congestion charging, may create negative benefits for society. In this effect, we develop a flexible pricing scheme internalizing costs arising from all externalities. Using a game theoretical approach, we extend the single authority road pricing scheme to a pricing scheme with multiple authorities/regions (with likely contradicting objectives).
Original language | Undefined |
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Title of host publication | Proceedings of the 11th Trail Congress |
Editors | T.P. Alkim, T. Arentze |
Place of Publication | Delft |
Publisher | TRAIL |
Pages | 1-5 |
Number of pages | 5 |
ISBN (Print) | 978-90-5584-139-4 |
Publication status | Published - 2010 |
Event | 11th International TRAIL Congress 2010: Connecting People - Integrating Expertise - Delft, Netherlands Duration: 23 Nov 2010 → 24 Nov 2010 Conference number: 11 |
Publication series
Name | |
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Publisher | TRAIL Research School |
Conference
Conference | 11th International TRAIL Congress 2010 |
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Country/Territory | Netherlands |
City | Delft |
Period | 23/11/10 → 24/11/10 |
Keywords
- IR-79688
- Nash equilibrium
- Multi-objective optimization
- Equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraint (EPEC)
- Road pricing
- EWI-21588
- MSC-90C90
- METIS-272967
- mathematical program with equilibriumconstraints (MPEC)