Multi-Objective Road Pricing: A Game Theoretic and Multi-Level Optimization Approach.

Anthony Ohazulike, Georg J. Still, Walter Kern, Eric C. van Berkum

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Using a game theoretical approach, we develop a pricing scheme that internalizes multiple traffic externalities. Further, we extend the single authority road pricing scheme to a scheme with multiple actors/stakeholders or regions. Road users’ interests are represented in the upper and the same level as the decision makers, thus, making them active players in the toll setting game. Having shown that pure Nash equilibrium (NE) toll may not exist among the stakeholders (with likely opposing objectives), we design a mechanism that induces NE which coincides with system optimum.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings 25th European Conference on Operational Research EURO 2012
Place of PublicationVilnius, Lithuania
Publication statusPublished - 8 Jul 2012


  • IR-101418
  • METIS-286438

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