Multi-Objective Road Pricing: A Game Theoretic and Multi-Level Optimization Approach.

Anthony Ohazulike; Georg J. Still; Walter Kern; Eric C. van Berkum

Multi-Objective Road Pricing: A Game Theoretic and Multi-Level Optimization Approach.

Anthony Ohazulike
, Georg J. Still
, Walter Kern
, Eric C. van Berkum

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review

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Abstract

Using a game theoretical approach, we develop a pricing scheme that internalizes multiple traffic externalities. Further, we extend the single authority road pricing scheme to a scheme with multiple actors/stakeholders or regions. Road users’ interests are represented in the upper and the same level as the decision makers, thus, making them active players in the toll setting game. Having shown that pure Nash equilibrium (NE) toll may not exist among the stakeholders (with likely opposing objectives), we design a mechanism that induces NE which coincides with system optimum.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings 25th European Conference on Operational Research EURO 2012
Place of Publication	Vilnius, Lithuania
Pages	-
Publication status	Published - 8 Jul 2012
Event	25th European Conference on Operational Research EURO 2012 - Vilnius, Lithuania Duration: 8 Jul 2012 → 11 Jul 2012

Conference

Conference	25th European Conference on Operational Research EURO 2012
Period	8/07/12 → 11/07/12
Other	8-11 July 2012

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 11 Sustainable Cities and Communities

Keywords

IR-101418
METIS-286438

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EURO25_AB

http://www.euro-online.org/conf/admin/tmp/program-euro25.pdf

Cite this

@inproceedings{d369075e1b0d4155aa7a015a7caa87a4,

title = "Multi-Objective Road Pricing: A Game Theoretic and Multi-Level Optimization Approach.",

abstract = "Using a game theoretical approach, we develop a pricing scheme that internalizes multiple traffic externalities. Further, we extend the single authority road pricing scheme to a scheme with multiple actors/stakeholders or regions. Road users{\textquoteright} interests are represented in the upper and the same level as the decision makers, thus, making them active players in the toll setting game. Having shown that pure Nash equilibrium (NE) toll may not exist among the stakeholders (with likely opposing objectives), we design a mechanism that induces NE which coincides with system optimum.",

keywords = "IR-101418, METIS-286438",

author = "Anthony Ohazulike and Still, \{Georg J.\} and Walter Kern and \{van Berkum\}, \{Eric C.\}",

year = "2012",

month = jul,

day = "8",

language = "English",

pages = "--",

booktitle = "Proceedings 25th European Conference on Operational Research EURO 2012",

note = "25th European Conference on Operational Research EURO 2012 ; Conference date: 08-07-2012 Through 11-07-2012",

}

Ohazulike, A, Still, GJ, Kern, W & van Berkum, EC 2012, Multi-Objective Road Pricing: A Game Theoretic and Multi-Level Optimization Approach. in Proceedings 25th European Conference on Operational Research EURO 2012. Vilnius, Lithuania, pp. -, 25th European Conference on Operational Research EURO 2012, 8/07/12. <http://www.euro-online.org/conf/admin/tmp/program-euro25.pdf>

TY - GEN

T1 - Multi-Objective Road Pricing: A Game Theoretic and Multi-Level Optimization Approach.

AU - Ohazulike, Anthony

AU - Still, Georg J.

AU - Kern, Walter

AU - van Berkum, Eric C.

PY - 2012/7/8

Y1 - 2012/7/8

N2 - Using a game theoretical approach, we develop a pricing scheme that internalizes multiple traffic externalities. Further, we extend the single authority road pricing scheme to a scheme with multiple actors/stakeholders or regions. Road users’ interests are represented in the upper and the same level as the decision makers, thus, making them active players in the toll setting game. Having shown that pure Nash equilibrium (NE) toll may not exist among the stakeholders (with likely opposing objectives), we design a mechanism that induces NE which coincides with system optimum.

AB - Using a game theoretical approach, we develop a pricing scheme that internalizes multiple traffic externalities. Further, we extend the single authority road pricing scheme to a scheme with multiple actors/stakeholders or regions. Road users’ interests are represented in the upper and the same level as the decision makers, thus, making them active players in the toll setting game. Having shown that pure Nash equilibrium (NE) toll may not exist among the stakeholders (with likely opposing objectives), we design a mechanism that induces NE which coincides with system optimum.

KW - IR-101418

KW - METIS-286438

M3 - Conference contribution

SP - -

BT - Proceedings 25th European Conference on Operational Research EURO 2012

CY - Vilnius, Lithuania

T2 - 25th European Conference on Operational Research EURO 2012

Y2 - 8 July 2012 through 11 July 2012

ER -

Multi-Objective Road Pricing: A Game Theoretic and Multi-Level Optimization Approach.

Abstract

Conference

UN SDGs

Keywords

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